“By merely having access to social media, private individuals could publish their thoughts without need of self-policing or adhering to the ethical standards required of the press. As a result, content could be created and shared with abandon, purely for clout or for ‘likes,’ and even in disregard of the truth.”
Thus lamented the Supreme Court En Banc, in a Decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, as it found Lorraine Marie T. Badoy-Partosa (Badoy) guilty of indirect contempt of court for statements she made online attacking Judge Marlo A. Magdoza-Malagar (Judge Magdoza-Malagar) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19.
On September 21, 2022, Judge Magdoza-Malagar issued a Resolution dismissing the petition of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to proscribe the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-New People’s Army (NPA) as a terrorist group under the Human Security Act.
Two days after, Badoy uploaded a public post on her Facebook page where she launched multiple insults against Judge Magdoza-Malagar. Badoy claimed that the judge was friends with the CPP-NPA-National Democratic Front (NDF) and that the judge “weaponiz[ed] a court of law to further inflict harm on a people that have long suffered the excesses and inhumanities of the CPP-NPA-NDF.”
Badoy also threatened to kill Judge Magdoza-Malagar: “So if I kill this judge and I do so out of my political belief that all allies of the CPP NPA NDF must be killed because there is no difference [in my mind] between a member of the CPP NPA NDF and their friends, then please be lenient with me.”
In a second post on the same day, Badoy further threatened to bomb the offices of judges whom Badoy deemed as “friends of terrorists.”
The next day, Badoy uploaded another post, describing Judge Magdoza-Malagar as “unprincipled and rotten” and claiming that the judge’s husband was a member of the CPP.
The posts made by Badoy, who has over 166,000 Facebook followers, generated comments, remarks, images, and videos of the same vitriol as her posts, openly supporting her statements and even offering assistance. Some posts even asked for Judge Magdoza-Malagar’s address. Badoy would later compile these responses and upload as another post.
Badoy’s statements prompted a group of lawyers to file a petition before the Court to cite her for indirect contempt.
In resolving the petition, the Court stressed the need to balance the exercise of free speech and the protection of judicial independence.
“One’s right to freedom of expression must be as fully protected as possible; however, its exercise must never transgress the equally important aspects of democracy, not least of all the Judiciary’s dignity and authority,” held the Court.
Thus, while the freedoms of expression, speech, and the press include the right to criticize judicial conduct, such exercise must not threaten judicial independence.
To ensure judicial independence, courts possess the inherent power to punish for contempt. This power is considered “a permissible subsequent punishment for those who abuse their constitutional freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the press.
Direct contempt is committed when one engages in “misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings” while indirect contempt involves actions that are committed not within the presence of the court, including improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
The power to cite for contempt is essential to preserve order in judicial proceedings, and for courts to enforce their judgments, orders, and mandates and ensure the due administration of justice. This also prevents “the proliferation of untruths which, if unrefuted, would gain an undue influence in the public discourse.”
“Judges who are the subject of fake news in their judicial capacity are prevented by propriety from defending themselves through social media or explaining themselves through a representative. They may only defend themselves in the proper forum—in contempt proceedings,” said the Court.
As explained in its 2008 ruling in In re Macasaet, there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges. “Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also undermine the people’s confidence in the courts.”
While contemptuous speech is generally subject to punishment, it may fall under the recognized qualified privileges protected under free speech if: (a) made in good faith and without malice; (b) it is a fair and true reporting of a proceeding or any of its incidents or (c) it is a fair commentary on matters of public interest. To be considered fair, the comment or criticism must be grounded in truth and facts, stressed the Court.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the Court found that Badoy’s posts constitute improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, which equates to indirect contempt.
Badoy’s assertion that Judge Magdoza-Malagar dismissed the DOJ’s petition because of the judge’s supposed friendly ties with the CPP-NPA-NDF threatens the impartial image of the Judiciary, the Court ruled.
Badoy’s claim that the judge lawyered for one of the parties due to her alleged political leanings similarly harms the court’s administration of justice. Badoy even claimed that the judge was assisted by the CPP-NPA-NDF when she wrote the decision, putting into question its legality.
The Court further found that Badoy failed to allege the existence of any qualified privilege that applied when she published her posts on Facebook.
First, Badoy’s ‘criticisms’ were not made in good faith or without malice. She did not act with an honest sense of duty or with an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and public affairs. Instead, she was impelled by a self-seeking motive, which was to stir discontent among her audience, as evidenced by her use of violent and abrasive language in hurling accusations at Judge Magdoza-Malagar.
Second, Badoy’s comments were not a fair and true reporting of a proceeding. On the contrary, Badoy imputed serious allegations against Judge Magdoza-Malagar and the Judiciary without any factual basis, said the Court. Her posts and even the pleadings she filed before the Court do not indicate that she possesses evidence to support her scandalous statements.
Third, her statements were not grounded in truth and facts and, thus, do not constitute “fair commentaries on matters of public interest.”
By alleging that Judge Magdoza-Malagar had basis other than the Constitution and the law in dismissing the proscription case, and by claiming that the decision was written by the winning party, Badoy cast doubt on the decision’s legitimacy. As a result, numerous members of the public prejudged the case, held the Court.
While “mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated,” declarations, such as those made by Badoy, ascribing improper motives to and rounding up public support to exert pressure on Judge Magdoza-Malagar, cannot be seen as criticism done in good faith. “It is nothing but an act of intimidation to influence the resolution of a pending case,” the Court stressed.
The Court further clarified that malicious imputations made even after the finality of a decision still fall under contemptuous speech if they tend to disrespect the court or create clear and present danger in the administration of justice.
The Court also found that Badoy’s “explosive statements” threatening to kill Judge Magdoza-Malagar and other judges were clearly made to incite Badoy’s followers and produce imminent lawless action, as evidenced by the multiple comments subsequently posted openly supporting the statements and even offering assistance. Some have even gone as far as asking for Judge Magdoza-Malagar’s address, a clear sign that they intended to execute Badoy’s call.
Such incitement to commit lawless violent action likely to cause death or injury is not covered by the constitutional privilege of protected speech, stressed the Court. “As shown by past experiences here and abroad, when such incitement to cause lawless violent action is done through social media by its influencers, the imminence is high that it will actually be committed by those so provoked.”
Badoy’s statements, though unsubstantiated, have the power to spark a deluge of assaults against the Judiciary and its members, and thus cannot be dismissed by the Court.
Neither was the Court persuaded by Badoy’s excuse that her post was mere ‘hypothetical syllogism’: “If [Badoy] truly meant no harm, she would have pacified her followers and explained that she was merely employing ‘hypothetical syllogism.’ Instead, [Badoy] continued to post scores of statements further stroking the fire.”
The Court concluded that Badoy’s statements jeopardized the Judiciary by “sowing distrust and impairing the public’s confidence in the honesty, integrity, and impartiality of those donning judicial robes. She was not merely advancing her advocacy when she made those incendiary statements on social media; she effectively made a call to action against Judge Magdoza-Malagar and the entire Judiciary,” said the Court.
Badoy was thus fined PHP 30,000 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
The Court also cautioned online personalities and influencers, underscoring that unregulated speech online and the spread of fake news pose real consequences in the real world.
“To maintain their popularity, online personalities tend to publish a steady stream of shocking or attention-grabbing content to take advantage of their audience’s negativity bias, that is, the natural human tendency to latch on to something bad rather than good. In a bid to ensure that their posts would become viral, they would make statements that produce heightened negative emotions, chasing after the dopamine rush brought about by the substantial increase in their followers and likes. The result is a proliferation of posts made to further their personal gain and popularity, without regard for the public good,” said the Court.
The Court further observed how social media’s wide audience, unconstrained by physical reach, has inevitably led to “a glut in disseminated information, a large part of which is disinformation—the ‘verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm’ on the internet.”
Online personalities thus have a duty to verify the truthfulness of the content they put out on the internet. “It behooves them to validate the source of news through fact-checking and even through source-checking, lest they unwittingly disseminate fake news and even cause real-world harm,” warned the Court. (Courtesy of the Supreme Court Public Information Office)
FULL TEXT of A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC and G.R. No. 263384, Re: Statements made by Lorraine Marie T. Badoy allegedly threatening Judge Marlo A. Magdoza-Malagar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, et al. v. Lorraine Marie T. Badoy-Partosa (August 15, 2023) at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/22-09-16-sc-263384-re-statements-made-by-lorraine-marie-t-badoy-allegedly-threatening-judge-marlo-a-magdoza-malagar-atty-rico-v-domingo-dean-antonio-gabriel-m-la-vina-dean-ma-soledad-deriquit/